Le Hoang Da
Independent Philosopher & Buddhist Scholar
Residual karmic fruition is like a droplet still resting on a leaf after the rain of karma has passed.
I. The Text and the Philosophical Problem
Fo shuo xingqi xing jing (佛說興起行經, T0197), commonly rendered as the Sūtra on the Arising of Karmic Actions, belongs to the Āgama corpus—the early stratum of Buddhist scriptures preserved in the Chinese canon. The extant version is found in the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Taishō Tripiṭaka), no. T0197, translated during the Later Han period by the Tripiṭaka master Kāng Mèngxiáng (康孟詳). The title “興起行” may be understood as “actions that give rise [to consequences]” or “acts that generate subsequent effects,” already suggesting that the sūtra’s central concern lies in the structure of causality operating across multiple lifetimes.
The text is divided into two fascicles and consists of ten shorter sūtras titled Sùyuán jīng (宿緣經), accounts of former conditions or antecedent causes. Each episode presents an event from the life of Śākyamuni Buddha—being struck by a stone hurled by Devadatta, suffering a bleeding toe from a fragment of rock, being slandered by a Brahmin woman, subsisting on barley during famine, or practicing asceticism for six years prior to awakening—and then traces that event back to a deed committed in a remote past life. That deed resulted in prolonged rebirth in hell or other unfortunate realms, and even after attaining Buddhahood, a “residual retribution” (yúyāng, 餘殃) continues to manifest as an unavoidable condition.
The distinctive feature of T0197 does not lie merely in recounting former lives, a genre familiar from the Jātaka and Avadāna traditions. Rather, what is philosophically striking is that the central figure in these narratives is not a bodhisattva still on the path, but a Buddha who has already achieved unsurpassed awakening. In other words, the text raises a profound philosophical question: why does a Buddha—one who has “eradicated all evils and fully perfected all virtues” (眾惡已盡、諸善普具)—still undergo painful consequences rooted in the past?
In several passages, the Buddha explicitly declares that these sufferings are not caused by gods, kings, or any external agency, but by his own past actions. The repeated statement, “Conditions and causes never perish, nor do they fall into empty space” (因緣終不朽，亦不著虛空), becomes a central axis of the text. While affirming the continuity of karmic causality, this assertion also risks being interpreted as a form of fatalism if not read with sufficient care.
The key question this article seeks to address is therefore the following: does T0197 present a rigid doctrine of karma in which all past deeds must inevitably be repaid in full, regardless of present enlightenment? Or does it articulate a more nuanced conception of “residual retribution”—a remaining condition that no longer has the capacity to generate rebirth, yet can still appear as a bodily or circumstantial phenomenon?
To answer this question, a distinction must be drawn between two levels: (1) karma as a force conditioning rebirth, and (2) residual retribution as the remainder of a causal structure that has already ceased to generate further existence. In T0197, the Buddha repeatedly emphasizes that the outflows (āsava) have been completely eradicated and that no further rebirth will occur. Accordingly, the hardships described are neither newly produced karma nor karma leading to future rebirth; rather, they are the residual traces of a causal process whose cycle of saṃsāra has already been brought to completion.
Particularly significant is the eighth episode (婆羅門女栴沙謗佛緣經), in which the Buddha engages King Ajātaśatru in a discussion concerning the relative weight of bodily, verbal, and mental actions. There appears the well-known statement: “Mental action is the gravest; verbal action is intermediate; bodily action is the least” (意行最重，口行處中，身行在下). Causality does not reside merely in outward conduct; it is first “nailed down” in intention. This indicates that T0197 is not simply a collection of moralistic tales of retribution, but a sustained reflection on the inner structure of action.
The aim of this article, therefore, is not to retell the ten narratives individually, but to read them as a coherent philosophical whole. It will argue that T0197 articulates a distinctive conception of the inevitability of residual retribution—yet this inevitability does not amount to fatalism. Rather, it highlights the crucial difference between the impossibility of erasing a condition once formed and the absence of bondage to that condition within saṃsāra.
In this reading, awakening does not negate causality; it terminates the production of new causality. Residual retribution may still manifest as bodily phenomena, yet the stream of rebirth has ceased. It is precisely within this apparent paradox—a Buddha who still experiences pain but no longer suffers—that T0197 opens a philosophical depth concerning inner freedom within the framework of karmic causation.
II. Narrative Structure and the Repetitive Model of Residual Retribution in T0197
When the Fo shuo xingqi xing jing (T0197) is read as a coherent whole, what stands out first is not its moral exhortation, but its almost formulaic narrative structure. The ten shorter sūtras (Sùyuán jīng, 宿緣經) do not function as independent stories; rather, they operate as variations on a unified causal model.
1. The Fourfold Narrative Pattern
Most episodes in T0197 follow a remarkably stable four-step structure.
First, an event occurs in the Buddha’s present life: Devadatta hurls a stone (episode seven), a Brahmin woman slanders him (episode eight), he subsists on barley for ninety days (episode nine), he practices asceticism for six years (episode ten), suffers headaches when the Śākya clan is massacred, or is wounded by a fragment of rock.
Second, Śāriputra raises the question: “For what reason and condition (以何因緣)?” This inquiry is not emotional but philosophical. It asks: to which structure of causality does this event belong?
Third comes the retrospective disclosure of a former life. The Buddha recounts a deed committed in a remote past: killing a half-brother, slandering an arhat, harboring jealousy toward monks, reviling Kāśyapa Buddha, stabbing someone in a dispute, or even taking delight at the sight of fish being beaten.
Finally, the episode concludes with a recurring formula, expressed in slightly varied forms:
“Conditions and causes never perish, nor do they fall into empty space” (因緣終不朽，亦不著虛空).
This is followed by the admonition:
“One should guard body, speech, and mind” (當護身、口、意).
This systematic repetition indicates that T0197 is not designed to evoke emotional responses to past events, but to illustrate a principle: action does not vanish; it merely shifts its mode of existence within the structure of dependent origination.
2. The Consistency of “Residual Retribution”
In every case, the past deed has already been “repaid” through prolonged rebirth in hell or other unfortunate realms. Yet the text does not end there. Even after rebirth-producing karma has completed its function, there remains something termed yúyāng (餘殃)—residual retribution.
Residual retribution no longer has the capacity to generate new rebirth. It does not lead to further descent, nor does it initiate a new karmic chain. Nevertheless, it may manifest as a bodily wound, a social event, a historical circumstance, or a series of misunderstandings.
Thus, T0197 develops a clearly stratified two-level model: rebirth-producing karma generates saṃsāric existence, whereas residual retribution appears merely as a remaining phenomenon. This distinction is crucial. The text does not equate every consequence with rebirth-generating karma. Certain conditions no longer bind one to saṃsāra, yet they may still appear as the “imprint” of the past.
3. The Role of Śāriputra: The Philosopher-Questioner
Throughout the sūtra, Śāriputra is not merely a reverent disciple; he represents analytical intelligence. Each narrative is initiated by his question. This creates a distinctive discursive frame: events are neither accepted as random nor attributed to divine agency, but must be explained through conditions and causes.
The question-and-answer structure gives T0197 the character of a treatise on causality rather than a collection of moral tales. The inquiry “for what reason and condition?” transforms narrative into philosophical investigation.
4. The Non-Externalization of Cause
Another striking feature is the Buddha’s repeated insistence:
“This is not made by father, nor by mother, nor by king, nor by heaven… it is created by myself” (此對亦非父作、亦非母作、亦非王作、亦非天作…本我自造).
This statement eliminates three explanatory alternatives: divine will, metaphysical fate, and collective responsibility. T0197 consistently locates causality in personal action. Yet the “person” here is not a permanent self, but a dynamic continuity of actions and intentions operating within dependent origination.
5. Repetition as Pedagogical Method
The formulaic repetition across the ten episodes may appear monotonous from a purely literary perspective. Pedagogically, however, it functions as a technique: repetition engrains understanding, shapes cognitive patterns, and underscores the universality of the principle. There are no exceptions, no special privileges—not even for a Buddha. Causality operates impartially.
It is precisely this consistency that sharpens the philosophical problem: if even a Buddha cannot “avoid” residual retribution, where is freedom to be located?
6. Transition to Philosophical Analysis
From this repetitive structure, three central insights emerge: causality does not disappear after awakening; awakening terminates rebirth; and residual retribution does not generate new karmic chains. It is within the tension among these three claims that the philosophical issue arises.
Without a clear distinction between rebirth-producing karma and residual retribution, one easily falls into two extremes: either asserting that a Buddha still possesses karma in the ordinary sense, or claiming that causality is suspended upon awakening. T0197 supports neither view. Instead, it presents a more complex model in which causality continues to operate as condition, yet no longer binds the stream of existence.
III. Residual Retribution and Rebirth-Producing Karma: A Foundational Distinction
Unless a clear distinction is established between rebirth-producing karma and residual retribution, the entirety of T0197 risks being misread as a manifesto of fatalism. For this reason, the present section functions as a form of “philosophical clarification” of the text.
1. Rebirth-Producing Karma: The Function of Generating Rebirth
In early Buddhist thought, karma (kamma/karma) has a central function: it conditions rebirth within saṃsāra. Bodily, verbal, and mental actions, when driven by ignorance and craving, accumulate rebirth-producing potency (upapatti-kamma), that is, the capacity to generate a new existence.
When an arhat or a Buddha declares, “All evils have been exhausted, all virtues fully perfected” (眾惡已盡、諸善普具), this signifies that the outflows (āsava) have been eradicated, ignorance has ceased, craving has ended, and the chain of rebirth has been cut off. Understood in this sense, a Buddha no longer possesses rebirth-producing karma; there remain no conditions for future rebirth.
T0197 repeatedly affirms this point: the hardships described do not lead to another cycle of existence; there is no subsequent rebirth, nor is any “new karma” accumulated.
2. Residual Retribution: The Remainder of a Closed Causal Structure
Yet T0197 employs the distinctive term yúyāng (餘殃), which may be translated as “residual retribution.” This indicates that the sūtra distinguishes between karma that has completed its rebirth-producing function and the remainder of a causal structure.
Residual retribution is not karma in the process of accumulation. It resembles momentum already set in motion, a force already released, or a consequence already unfolding. It no longer has the capacity to generate saṃsāric existence, yet it may still manifest as bodily phenomena or circumstantial conditions.
In several episodes, the Buddha recounts that after having endured innumerable aeons in hell due to past deeds, there still remains “residual retribution” resulting in a bleeding wound from a stone, slander, headaches, hunger, or six years of ascetic practice. This shows that residual retribution is not punishment; rather, it is the final condition of a causal chain not yet entirely dissolved.
3. Residual Retribution Does Not Equal Bondage
The subtle point lies here: residual retribution may manifest as pain, yet it does not amount to suffering in the ontological sense. The Buddha may be wounded, yet he is not bound; he may be slandered, yet he does not respond with greed, hatred, or delusion; he may encounter adverse circumstances, yet he produces no new karma.
One may therefore speak of two parallel levels. On the level of phenomena, there is pain, there are conditions, there are consequences. On the level of existential realization, there is no dukkha in the sense of clinging, no reproduction of conditions, and no further rebirth.
Without distinguishing these two levels, one might assume that awakening must eliminate all consequences. T0197 demonstrates the opposite: awakening does not erase conditions; it eradicates clinging to conditions.
4. “Inevitability” Is Not “Immutability”
The sūtra repeatedly asserts: “Conditions and causes never perish, nor do they fall into empty space” (因緣終不朽，亦不著虛空). However, “never perishing” does not mean “incapable of transformation.”
What is inevitable is that once an action has arisen, it cannot be made as though it never occurred; once a causal structure has formed, it cannot be nullified by sheer will. Yet what remains transformable is the mode in which that condition is received, integrated into existence, and whether it continues to generate further cycles of rebirth.
Inevitability at the level of conditions does not imply immutability at the level of liberation.
5. A Rejection of Fatalism
If T0197 advocated fatalism, then the Buddha would still be governed by karma in the same way as ordinary beings; no fundamental distinction would exist between awakening and non-awakening; and causality would operate as an absolute deterministic mechanism.
The text affirms the contrary. The Buddha no longer undergoes rebirth, no longer generates new karma, and is no longer bound. Residual retribution is therefore not evidence of the impotence of awakening, but an illustration of a different truth: awakening does not erase the past, but it terminates the future of that past.
6. Residual Retribution as a Phenomenon of the Five Aggregates
Residual retribution may be understood as occurring within the still-existing five aggregates. As long as a Buddha possesses a physical body, that body remains embedded within the network of material conditions: gravity still operates, stones can still wound, hunger arises, and climate brings heat and cold.
The difference lies in the mind. No longer identifying with the body, no longer clinging to sensations, pain does not become suffering. In this sense, T0197 articulates a refined conception of liberation: freedom is not immunity from phenomena, but freedom within phenomena.
7. Transition Toward the Core Issue
The distinction between rebirth-producing karma and residual retribution allows us to understand that the “inevitability” described in T0197 is not metaphysical destiny, but the continuity of dependent origination.
However, to grasp more deeply why actions carry such weight, we must turn to the point emphasized by the sūtra: “Mental action is the gravest” (意行最重). It is at the level of intention that causality is, as it were, “nailed down.”
IV. Mental Action as the Center of the Karmic Structure
Within the entirety of T0197, the dialogue between the Buddha and King Ajātaśatru in the eighth episode occupies a pivotal position. When asked which type of action carries the greatest weight, the Buddha replies: “Mental action is the gravest; verbal action is intermediate; bodily action is the least” (意行最重，口行處中，身行在下). This statement is not a conventional moral exhortation; it constitutes the structural axis of the entire sūtra. Without grasping the central role of mental action, one cannot understand how past deeds can extend their effects even into the life of a fully awakened Buddha.
The text employs a striking metaphor: all bodily and verbal actions are “fastened to the nail of intention” (繫於意釘). This image implies an internal hierarchy: intention arises first, speech forms afterward, and action is executed last. Body and speech do not operate independently; they are expressions of a structure already fixed within intention. Accordingly, when T0197 traces the origins of residual retribution, what is scrutinized is not merely the physical act but the motivating impulse that set it in motion. It is not the stone that constitutes karma, but the intention that hurled the stone.
Bodily action exists only for a moment; verbal action sounds and then dissipates; but mental action can endure as a lasting disposition. A single thought of jealousy, greed, or contempt does not merely produce an isolated act; it may crystallize into a psychological pattern, reactivated in new contexts and shaping one’s entire orientation toward the world. For this reason, mental action possesses a greater “temporal depth” than body or speech. It is the locus where karma is conceived and preserved. Many of the past-life episodes in T0197 emphasize not the physical gesture itself, but the mental structure underlying it—greed, hatred, jealousy, conceit. The weight of karma lies in that structure.
This principle is not unique to T0197. It converges with an idea already articulated in the Dhammapada, whose opening verses declare: “Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā manomayā”—mind precedes all phenomena; mind is chief; they are mind-made. “Mind goes before” and “mind is supreme” express the same structural intuition that T0197 formulates as “mental action is the gravest.” Though belonging to different linguistic traditions, both texts affirm that causality is fundamentally a causality of mind. T0197 thus does not invent an isolated karmic doctrine; it develops, in a consistent manner, a foundational principle of early Buddhism: consciousness is the center of the karmic structure.
This analysis brings into relief the fundamental distinction between the ordinary person and the Buddha. In the unenlightened individual, defiled mental action produces bodily and verbal actions, accumulates rebirth-producing karma, and perpetuates saṃsāra. In a Buddha, mental action has been completely purified; ignorance has ceased, the motives of greed, hatred, and delusion are absent, and no new karma is generated. When residual retribution manifests as bodily pain, it is not accompanied by clinging intention. Pain may arise as a physiological phenomenon, but it does not transform into suffering in the ontological sense. Causality continues to function at the level of conditions, but not at the level of rebirth.
T0197 therefore neither denies causality nor suspends it upon awakening. What awakening terminates is the production of new karmic conditions. Residual retribution may continue to appear in the still-existing body, yet mental action is no longer governed by ignorance; hence, no new cycle is generated. Freedom, in this framework, is not immunity from conditions but freedom within conditions.
From this, three philosophical consequences follow. First, causality in T0197 is primarily a structure of consciousness rather than a merely physical mechanism. Second, residual retribution is the remaining phenomenon of a causal chain that has already fulfilled its rebirth-producing function. Third, awakening is the cessation of the reproduction of defiled mental action. The “inevitability” of residual retribution is not a metaphysical destiny, but the consequence of a mental structure once activated. For this reason, each episode concludes with the admonition: “Guard body, speech, and mind” (當護身、口、意). The warning is not grounded in fear of punishment, but in the recognition that this is the sole point at which the stream of causality can be transformed.
V. Six Years of Asceticism: Residual Retribution and the Limits of Ascetic Means
In the tenth episode of T0197, when recounting the former life of the “Youth Huo Man,” the Buddha refers to a significant detail: because of a past statement of contempt directed toward Kāśyapa Buddha—“How can a shaven-headed one be a Buddha? The path to Buddhahood is exceedingly difficult to attain!” (髠頭何有佛？佛道甚難得！)—he was required, in his present life on the verge of awakening, to undergo six years of ascetic practice.
During those six years, he is said to have subsisted each day on a single sesame seed or a single grain of rice; his body grew emaciated, enduring hunger, cold, and heat. Yet he ultimately declared: “It was of no benefit to the Dharma” (於法無益).
This detail is decisive for understanding T0197. A superficial reading might interpret the six years of asceticism as a form of karmic repayment through bodily suffering. The text itself, however, rejects such an interpretation. Asceticism did not bring about awakening; it merely completed a former condition. Enlightenment did not occur because of asceticism, but only after asceticism had been transcended.
Here, two distinct levels must be differentiated. The first is residual retribution: the continuation of a causal structure once activated in the past. The second is the path of practice: the means leading to liberation. The six years of asceticism belong to the first level; the Middle Way belongs to the second. Confusing these levels results either in fatalism or in voluntarism.
T0197 does not endorse fatalism. The Buddha does not claim that past karma made Buddhahood impossible. On the contrary, it is precisely after the former condition has been completed that awakening manifests. Yet the text equally avoids voluntarism. The six years of self-mortification demonstrate that bodily exertion alone is insufficient to break ignorance. Awakening is not determined by the intensity of suffering, but by the transformation of insight.
The statement “of no benefit to the Dharma” thus carries methodological weight. It establishes the limits of asceticism as a bodily technique. If bodily action is not guided by wisdom, it cannot by itself liberate mental action. This is consistent with the analysis in Section IV: mental action is the center of the karmic structure. Only when ignorance at the level of intention is dismantled does the reproduction of new karma cease.
However, the fact that asceticism is not the ultimate means to awakening does not entail a rejection of diligent effort. T0197 does not advocate negligence or indulgence. What is rejected is not effort itself, but the confusion of means with end. Indulgence nourishes defiled mental action; extreme asceticism, on the other hand, may subtly reaffirm a refined ego seeking merit. Both are distinct expressions of ignorance.
The Middle Way, therefore, is not a compromise between pleasure and mortification; it is a precise calibration of spiritual energy. It does not diminish effort; it redirects effort. The six years of asceticism illustrate the limits of bodily action, while meditation beneath the Bodhi tree illustrates the shift of emphasis from physical exertion to transformative insight. The lesson is not “do not strive,” but rather “strive in the right place.”
Accordingly, the six years of asceticism do not demonstrate that the Buddha remained karmically bound in an ontological sense. They show only that as long as the body persists within the network of worldly conditions, former consequences may continue to manifest. Yet because mental action has been purified, no new karmic production occurs. Pain may arise at the physiological level; suffering in the existential sense does not.
Thus, the case of the six years of asceticism reinforces the central thesis of this article: residual retribution is the continuation of a causal structure once activated, whereas awakening is the cessation of the capacity to reactivate that structure. What is inevitable is the functioning of conditions while the body remains; what is possible is freedom from the reproduction of ignorance.
This section therefore serves as a bridge. From the structure of mental action analyzed in Section IV, we see that asceticism is not the path; and from a proper understanding of the six years of asceticism, we grasp the true significance of residual retribution throughout T0197.
VI. The Structure of the Forms of Residual Retribution in T0197
If T0197 is read merely as a collection of disconnected past-life stories, it may appear to be nothing more than moral tales of karmic causation. However, when the ten episodes are situated within a unified analytical framework, they reveal themselves as a deliberately constructed system illustrating distinct forms of residual retribution. Residual retribution in the sūtra does not arise randomly; it corresponds to the three domains of action: body, speech, and mind.
First, there is residual retribution related to bodily action. The episode in which Devadatta hurls a stone that causes the Buddha’s foot to bleed serves as a paradigmatic example. In a former life, the deep cause is described as pushing a half-brother into a ravine and crushing his body with stones. In the present life, however, the consequence is no longer death, but merely a minor wound to the toe. What is striking is not the degree of pain, but the asymmetry between cause and effect: a grave act does not culminate in an equivalent catastrophe, but leaves only a slight trace.
This suggests that karmic causality has gradually reached closure by the time the subject has attained awakening; what remains is only residual retribution. There is no reversal or suspension of karmic law. Karma does not wait until the final moment to operate; it has functioned throughout the entire path of cultivation. Once the structure of ignorance is dismantled, what remains is only the completion of conditions already in motion.
Second, there is residual retribution related to verbal action. The case of the woman who falsely accuses the Buddha of impregnating her provides a clear illustration. In the former life, words of jealousy and slander directed toward an arhat constitute the deep cause. In the present life, the false accusation appears before the assembly, yet it cannot damage the Buddha’s wisdom or purity. The residual retribution here is not the destruction of reputation, but the necessity of confronting slander.
The crucial point is that the slander does not trigger a new psychological chain. There is no anger, no egoic self-defense, no production of further karma. The former causality completes itself at the phenomenal level; it does not become the starting point of a new cycle. Here the distinction between the unenlightened and the awakened becomes clear: the difference does not lie in whether adverse events occur, but in whether such events generate new karma.
Third, there is residual retribution related to mental action. The episode in which jealousy toward monks during the time of Buddha Vipāśyin results in subsisting on horse fodder for ninety days is an instructive case. The underlying structure is an intention of contempt—the thought that others “deserve only inferior food.” In the present life, the circumstance of receiving coarse sustenance appears as the effect. Yet because present mental action has been purified, the event no longer produces defiled intentions.
Taken as a whole, the episodes reveal a common pattern: residual retribution always manifests at the level of bodily experience or circumstantial conditions, but it never reactivates defiled mental action. This is entirely consistent with the principle “mental action is the gravest” (意行最重) analyzed in Section IV. Once mental action has been liberated from ignorance, former consequences lose the capacity to proliferate.
Another notable feature is the finitude of residual retribution. The text frequently employs expressions such as “remaining conditions” (殘緣) or “residual retribution” (餘殃), emphasizing that these are remnants of a causal chain that has reached its final phase. Residual retribution is not portrayed as an infinite karmic force relentlessly pursuing the subject; it is the completion of a process already underway. Causality is not broken at awakening; it is brought to closure.
At this point, we may clearly distinguish between “karma in production” and “residual retribution in completion.” Karma in production refers to defiled mental action generating new conditions for saṃsāra. Residual retribution in completion refers to the remaining conditions of a former structure that no longer possesses the capacity to regenerate itself. The Buddha may still experience pain, face slander, or consume coarse food; yet he can no longer be drawn back into the cycle of birth and death.
Thus, when T0197 repeatedly concludes with the admonition, “Guard body, speech, and mind” (當護身、口、意), it is not merely a moral formula. It is a warning concerning the operative structure of causality. If mental action is guarded, bodily and verbal actions do not generate new conditions; if mental action is neglected, the entire system of causation is reactivated.
This section therefore allows us to view T0197 not as a collection of edifying tales, but as a cartography of karmic process. The three forms of residual retribution correspond to the three domains of action, and in every case the decisive point lies at the level of intention. When mental action has been purified, causality does not disappear, but it no longer reproduces ignorance. What remains is only residual retribution—the final condition of a process already brought to completion.
VII. Causality as a Process of Closure: From the Production of Karma to the Completion of Residual Retribution
T0197 does not present causality as a mechanism of punishment, nor does it interpret it as an immutable destiny. What the sūtra clarifies is a twofold structure of karma and its fruition.
The first level is the level of production. Here, bodily, verbal, and mental actions—under the influence of ignorance and craving—generate new conditions. In all ten cases recounted in the text, the originating source lies in mental action: a thought of greed, a moment of hatred, an impulse of jealousy, a careless word. It is at this level that the process of causality is set in motion.
The second level is the level of completion. When the subject has eradicated the outflows (āsava), the productive level ceases. There is no longer any motive for generating new karma. Nevertheless, conditions established in the past continue to unfold according to their trajectory until they reach their conclusion. That remaining unfolding is residual retribution.
Thus, causality in T0197 operates on two strata: a generative stratum and a closing stratum. The generative stratum belongs to defiled mental action; the closing stratum belongs to the completion of previously established conditions. Awakening terminates the first stratum without negating the second. Causality is not distorted at the moment of Buddhahood; rather, it gradually reaches closure through the transformation of inner structure.
In this light, the arhat’s declaration in the Dhammapada—“Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyāti” (“Birth is exhausted, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to this state of being”)—must be understood precisely. “Birth is exhausted” does not mean that the past has been erased; it means that the source of the reproduction of causality—craving and ignorance—has been eliminated. No new karma is produced. The cycle of birth and death does not continue because the conditions for its continuation no longer exist.
Accordingly, the declaration that “this is the final birth” does not deny causality; it affirms that the process of causality has been fully completed within the structure of an awakened subject. What still appears thereafter is only the residual retribution of conditions established prior to full awakening.
T0197 therefore does not weaken the principle of causality; on the contrary, it safeguards the consistency of dependent origination. Awakening is not a supernatural intervention into the law governing reality; it is a radical transformation of the inner structure such that the law is no longer reproduced.
If causality is likened to a flowing stream, awakening is not a wall erected across its current. Awakening is the drying up of its source. When the source ceases, the remaining water naturally flows to its end.
This is the true meaning of the “inevitability of residual retribution” in T0197—not an unalterable destiny, but the necessary completion of what has once been set in motion.
VIII. Awakening as the Completion of a Karmic Structure
The Fo shuo xingqi xing jing (T0197) is not intended as a collection of edifying legends about the Buddha’s former lives. The ten cases presented in the sūtra serve a coherent and consistent purpose: to establish the continuity of causality even in the case of a subject who has attained complete awakening.
At a superficial level, one may be struck by an apparent paradox: why does a Fully Awakened One still suffer headaches and back pain, endure being struck by stones, face slander, or subsist on coarse barley? This paradox arises only if one presupposes that awakening must be a transcendent power capable of suspending the law of causality. T0197 rejects such a presupposition.
The sūtra conveys the opposite: awakening is not the breaking of causality, but the completion of causality.
Throughout the entire process of cultivation—from ordinary being to Buddhahood—causality operates without interruption. Past bodily, verbal, and mental actions establish conditions. As long as those conditions have not yet reached completion, they continue to manifest in the form of residual retribution. However, once ignorance and craving have been eradicated, the production of new karma ceases. What remains is merely the completion of structures formed prior to awakening.
For this reason, the “inevitability of residual retribution” in T0197 is not a doctrine of fatalism. It does not assert that human beings are absolutely bound to an unalterable destiny. What the sūtra emphasizes is that conditions once established will unfold until they are completed—unless the source that generates them is transformed. When that source is no longer present, the cycle ceases.
In this sense, the arhat’s declaration in the Dhammapada—“Birth is exhausted, the holy life fulfilled, what had to be done has been done”—is not a claim of exemption from causality, but an affirmation that a process has reached its closure. There is no further rebirth because there are no longer conditions for rebirth; there is no new karma because ignorance and craving have ended.
T0197 thus safeguards the coherence of dependent origination at the highest level. It permits no exceptions—not even for a Buddha. Yet at the same time, it opens the dimension of liberation: when the structure of mind has been transformed, causality is no longer a machine endlessly producing suffering. It becomes a current flowing naturally toward its conclusion.
Awakening does not cause causality to disappear; awakening brings causality to completion.
If causality is the law of conditions, awakening is the penetration of that law to the point where no new conditions are produced. What remains—whether headaches, bodily pain, or slander—is nothing more than the final ripples upon waters that have already ceased to be stirred.
Seen in this light, T0197 is not a text designed to instill fear of karmic retribution, but one that affirms radical moral responsibility. No one can escape what one has set in motion; yet no one is irreversibly trapped in endless production if one transforms the structure of mind at its root.
This is the deeper meaning of “the arising of action”: actions arise from mind and carry their consequences; but when the mind is liberated, action no longer forges new chains. Causality is not abolished—it is completed in the light of awakening.
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