Le Hoang Da
Buddhist Scholar
Figure 1: The Buddha teaching the monks while the Three Realms (Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, and Arūpadhātu) appear above, illustrating the cosmological dimensions referenced in the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115).
I. Introduction: The Problem of Correctly Understanding the Structure of Reality
In early Buddhist thought, wisdom (paññā) is not understood merely as an abstract capacity for speculative reasoning, but rather as the ability to see correctly the structure of experience. Numerous Pāli discourses show that the Buddha frequently analyzed the human world of experience into different constituent elements in order to clarify how phenomena arise, function, and cease. Through this analytical method, the teaching does not merely present an ethical system or a path of spiritual practice; it also provides a cognitive model of reality in which the elements of experience are observed and understood as processes of dependent arising, devoid of any inherent self-nature.
One of the most representative texts that illustrates this analytical approach is the Bahudhātuka Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 115). In this discourse, the Buddha presents a series of different classificatory systems concerning the “elements” (dhātu), that is, the constituent factors or domains of experience. These systems include well-known analyses such as the six elements (earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness), the eighteen elements related to the process of cognition (sense faculties, sense objects, and consciousness), as well as other classifications connected with different states of existence and forms of experience. Through these analyses, the discourse does not merely attempt to describe the world as a collection of constituent elements; it also shows that understanding the structure of these elements plays a crucial role in overcoming mistaken views about the self and reality.
A particularly noteworthy feature of the Bahudhātuka Sutta is the connection it establishes between the understanding of elements and the emergence of wrong views. According to the discourse, when a person fails to understand the nature and structure of the factors that constitute experience, they are prone to fall into various kinds of erroneous views about the world and about themselves. These views may include belief in a permanent self, metaphysical speculations about the ultimate nature of the world, or distorted conceptions regarding the relationship between actions, karma, and their results. In this way, wrong view is not merely treated as a matter of religious belief or moral error, but can also be understood as a consequence of misunderstanding the structure of experience.
Within this context, the concept of dhātu becomes an important analytical tool in early Buddhist thought. By analyzing experience into different constituent elements, the teaching reveals that what we commonly call “the world” or “the self” is in fact nothing more than a complex interplay of conditions. When these elements are observed correctly, the idea of an independent and unchanging entity becomes difficult to maintain. Thus, the analysis of elements does not merely serve a descriptive function; it also has a deconstructive significance, challenging mistaken assumptions about the self and existence.
From this perspective, the Bahudhātuka Sutta can be understood as one of the texts that most clearly exemplifies the phenomenological analytical tendency of early Buddhist thought. Rather than asking metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of the world, the discourse focuses on analyzing the concrete elements that constitute human experience. This approach reflects a characteristic method of the Buddha’s teaching: instead of affirming immutable essences, the Buddha directs attention to the processes and conditions that operate within present experience.
The present article aims to examine the Bahudhātuka Sutta as an important philosophical text within the early Buddhist tradition. By investigating the concept of dhātu and the various classificatory systems presented in the discourse, the study seeks to clarify how the analysis of experiential elements contributes to explaining the emergence of wrong views, while also opening a cognitive path toward understanding the non-self nature of reality. By situating the Bahudhātuka Sutta within the broader context of Buddhist thought, the article will also consider the role of this discourse as an important precursor to the later development of analytical philosophical traditions, particularly within the Abhidharma.
II. The Concept of “Element” (Dhātu) in Early Buddhist Thought
In many early Buddhist texts, the analysis of human experience into different constituent elements plays an important role in the presentation of the teaching. Such analyses are not intended merely to describe the world as a collection of phenomena; they also serve to help practitioners understand the dependent and non-self nature of experience. Within this context, the concept of dhātu—often translated as “element,” “constituent factor,” or “domain”—becomes a key term in the way the teaching analyzes reality.
Etymologically, the term dhātu in both Pāli and Sanskrit carries the basic meaning of a “component,” “fundamental element,” or “constitutive basis.” In Buddhist literature, however, the term is not used solely to refer to material elements such as earth, water, fire, and air. It is also employed to describe different domains or fields of experience, including the processes of cognition. For this reason, dhātu should not be understood simply as an “element” in the sense used in modern physical science; rather, it functions as an analytical category of experience that helps clarify how phenomena arise and interact.
In the Pāli discourses, the concept of dhātu frequently appears alongside two other analytical systems of the teaching: the five aggregates (khandha) and the twelve sense bases (āyatana). These three systems provide different approaches to analyzing the same experiential reality. The system of the five aggregates focuses on the psycho-physical components that constitute what people ordinarily call the “self,” namely form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. The system of the twelve sense bases analyzes experience in terms of the relationship between sense faculties and their corresponding objects. The system of elements (dhātu), in turn, extends this analysis by clarifying the various factors and domains involved in the process of cognition.
When considered together, the three systems of khandha, āyatana, and dhātu can thus be understood as complementary perspectives for analyzing experience. The aggregate system emphasizes the psycho-physical structure of the individual; the sense-base system focuses on the relationship between sensory faculties and their objects; and the element system highlights the various factors and domains involved in the cognitive process. Rather than portraying the world as a collection of independent entities, these systems reveal that human experience is formed through the interaction of multiple processes and conditions.
Within this framework, the use of the concept of dhātu in the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) can be understood as a distinctive extension of this analytical method. The very title of the discourse—“The Discourse on the Many Elements”—suggests a perspective in which the world is viewed as a structure composed of multiple constituent factors. Instead of referring to a single system of elements, the discourse presents several different classificatory frameworks in order to illuminate the diversity and complexity of the elements that constitute experience.
One of the most prominent systems mentioned in the discourse is the six elements (cha dhātuyo): earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. The first four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—are commonly regarded as basic material elements in many Buddhist texts as well as in other ancient Indian philosophical traditions. In the Buddhist context, however, these elements should not be interpreted in terms of modern physical science. Rather, they refer to characteristic qualities of matter: the earth element represents solidity and resistance, the water element cohesion, the fire element heat and energy, and the air element movement and pressure.
The Bahudhātuka Sutta, however, extends this traditional framework by including two additional elements: the space element (ākāsa-dhātu) and the consciousness element (viññāṇa-dhātu). This expansion is significant because it indicates that the analysis of experiential elements is not limited to the material domain but also includes the dimensions of space and cognition.
In addition to the system of six elements, the discourse also presents another analytical framework of particular importance for Buddhist epistemology: the eighteen elements (aṭṭhārasa dhātuyo). This system consists of three groups: the six sense faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), the six corresponding objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena), and the six types of consciousness associated with them. Taken together, these three groups describe a comprehensive model of the cognitive process, according to which experience arises from the interaction between a sense faculty, its corresponding object, and the relevant type of consciousness.
What is especially noteworthy about the system of eighteen elements is that it not only describes the structure of cognition but also highlights the interdependent nature of the factors that constitute experience. None of the elements in this system can exist or function independently; each arises only in relation to the others. In this way, the model offers a clear illustration of the principle of dependent arising within the domain of cognition.
From this perspective, the analysis of elements in the Bahudhātuka Sutta serves not only a descriptive function but also a deconstructive one. By dividing experience into different constituent factors, the discourse demonstrates that what people ordinarily regard as a unified “entity”—such as the self or the world—is in fact the result of interactions among multiple conditions. When these conditions are carefully observed, the notion of a fixed and independent essence becomes difficult to sustain.
For this reason, the concept of dhātu in early Buddhist thought is not merely a tool for classifying phenomena; it is also a method for dismantling mistaken assumptions about the nature of reality. Through the analysis of the constituent elements of experience, the teaching guides practitioners toward a perspective in which phenomena are understood as dependently arisen processes, devoid of inherent selfhood and constantly subject to change.
Within this context, the Bahudhātuka Sutta can be regarded as one of the texts that most clearly articulates the role of the concept of dhātu in the analysis of reality. The various classificatory systems presented in the discourse not only illuminate the structure of experience but also prepare the ground for the more elaborate philosophical analyses that would later emerge in Buddhist traditions, particularly in the Abhidharma. Indeed, it was from such early analytical efforts that the more systematic philosophical frameworks of later Buddhist thought gradually developed.
III. Systems of Elements in the Bahudhātuka Sutta
One of the most distinctive features of the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) is its presentation of multiple systems for classifying the “elements” (dhātu). These systems are not introduced in a random or fragmented manner; rather, they form an analytical structure designed to clarify the constituent factors of experience and the different domains in which reality operates. Through the examination of these systems of elements, the discourse demonstrates that what people ordinarily call “the world” or “the self” is in fact the result of interactions among many different factors.
Among the various systems mentioned in the discourse, the two most significant are the six elements and the eighteen elements. Each system represents a different approach to analyzing experience, while at the same time complementing the other in illuminating the structure of reality from the perspective of early Buddhist thought.
1. The Six Elements: From Material Factors to Cognitive Dimensions
The first system mentioned in the discourse is the six elements (cha dhātuyo), which consist of:
- the earth element (paṭhavī-dhātu)
- the water element (āpo-dhātu)
- the fire element (tejo-dhātu)
- the air element (vāyo-dhātu)
- the space element (ākāsa-dhātu)
- the consciousness element (viññāṇa-dhātu)
Figure 2: Artistic representation of the six elements (dhātu) in Buddhist thought—earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness—illustrating the analytical framework used in the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) to understand the structure of experience.
The first four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—are commonly regarded as fundamental material elements in many ancient Indian philosophical traditions, including Buddhist texts. In the Buddhist context, however, these elements should not be interpreted in terms of modern physical science. Rather, they refer to characteristic qualities of matter. The earth element represents solidity and resistance; the water element cohesion; the fire element heat and energy; and the air element movement and pressure.
The Bahudhātuka Sutta, however, does not limit its analysis to these four material elements. The discourse extends the system by including the space element and the consciousness element. This expansion is particularly significant because it indicates that the analysis of the constituents of reality is not restricted to the material domain but also encompasses the dimensions of space and cognition.
The space element (ākāsa-dhātu) is commonly understood as the factor that provides the openness or spatial field within which material phenomena can exist and interact. The consciousness element (viññāṇa-dhātu), on the other hand, represents the cognitive dimension of experience—the factor that makes it possible for objects to be known and experienced. Taken together, the six elements form a model in which matter, space, and cognition all participate in the constitution of the human world of experience.
2. The Eighteen Elements: A Model of the Cognitive Process
In addition to the system of six elements, the Bahudhātuka Sutta also presents another analytical framework of particular importance for Buddhist epistemology: the eighteen elements (aṭṭhārasa dhātuyo). This system consists of three groups of factors:
- the six sense faculties (indriya): eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind
- the six objects (viṣaya): forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and mental phenomena
- the six types of consciousness (viññāṇa): the corresponding consciousness associated with each sense faculty
These three groups together describe a comprehensive model of the cognitive process. According to this model, experience does not arise from an independent knowing subject; rather, it emerges through the interaction of three factors: a sense faculty, its corresponding object, and the appropriate form of consciousness.
For example, visual consciousness arises when the eye encounters visible form; auditory consciousness arises when the ear comes into contact with sound; and similar processes occur in relation to the other senses. This illustrates that cognition is not the activity of a single subject acting independently, but the result of a process that depends on multiple conditions.
The system of eighteen elements can therefore be understood as a model for analyzing cognition, in which the factors of experience are examined according to the ways they interact to generate awareness. Instead of assuming the existence of a permanent “self” standing behind experience, this model shows that cognition itself arises only when the appropriate conditions converge.
3. The Philosophical Significance of the Systems of Elements
When considered together, the systems of elements presented in the Bahudhātuka Sutta reveal a characteristic Buddhist approach to analyzing reality. Rather than describing the world as a collection of independent entities, the discourse analyzes experience into different constituent factors and emphasizes the interdependent relationships among them.
This approach has two important philosophical implications.
First, it suggests that the world of human experience is not a single unified or immutable entity but rather a network of interacting factors and conditions. Elements such as matter, space, and cognition do not exist independently; they arise only in relationships of mutual dependence.
Second, the analysis of experience into different elements weakens the notion of a permanent self. When what people ordinarily regard as the “self” is broken down into multiple factors—ranging from the material components of the body to the processes of cognition—it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the idea that a fixed and independent entity exists behind these phenomena.
For this reason, the systems of elements in the Bahudhātuka Sutta serve not only as descriptive classifications but also as a method of analysis that deconstructs mistaken assumptions about the nature of reality. By demonstrating that experience is composed of multiple interdependent factors, the discourse prepares the conceptual ground for more profound discussions concerning wrong views and the doctrine of non-self, which will be examined in the subsequent sections of this study.
IV. “Things That Cannot Occur” (Ṭhānāni) and the Limits of Possibility in Spiritual Life
One particularly noteworthy section of the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) is the passage that lists a series of cases described as ṭhānāni, that is, “things that cannot occur.” In this passage, the Buddha identifies various situations in which, according to the teaching, the event described is impossible within reality. These examples include cases related to mistaken cognition, the limits imposed by wrong views, as well as actions that an Arahant—one who has fully attained liberation—is no longer capable of performing.
At first glance, the list of such “impossibilities” in the discourse may appear to be a set of doctrinal or moral assertions. However, when examined more closely, this section reflects a deeper philosophical perspective concerning the limits of possibility within spiritual life. Rather than portraying the world as a realm of unlimited possibilities, the discourse suggests that the structure of experience and the state of the mind impose certain boundaries on what can occur.
One example mentioned in the discourse is the assertion that a person firmly established in wrong view cannot attain certain spiritual states. This statement should not be interpreted as a deterministic or metaphysical claim; rather, it reflects an observation about the structure of cognition and action. When the mind is dominated by mistaken conceptions of reality—such as belief in a permanent self or distorted assumptions about karma and its results—these conceptions shape the way in which a person perceives the world and responds to experience. As a result, certain forms of deeper understanding remain inaccessible as long as the necessary cognitive conditions have not yet been established.
The discourse also presents examples concerning Arahants. According to the Bahudhātuka Sutta, an Arahant—having completely eradicated greed, hatred, and delusion—is incapable of performing certain actions, such as intentionally committing serious moral offenses. These statements are not intended to create a list of prohibitions; rather, they reflect a fundamental transformation in the structure of spiritual life. When the roots of craving, aversion, and ignorance have been eradicated, the psychological motivations that give rise to unwholesome actions no longer exist. Consequently, such actions become impossible not because of an external rule, but because of an internal transformation of consciousness.
Figure 3: An Arahant gently touching a deer is contrasted with a hunter preparing to shoot a herd in the forest. In Buddhist doctrine, an Arahant who has eradicated greed, hatred, and delusion is no longer capable of intentionally harming living beings.
From this perspective, the ṭhānāni in the Bahudhātuka Sutta may be understood as a kind of logic of possibility and impossibility within Buddhist doctrine. The events described as “impossible” are not arbitrary assertions; rather, they reflect the relationship between the state of the mind and the range of actions or forms of cognition that can arise from that state. In other words, the structure of spiritual life determines what becomes possible and what becomes impossible.
This analysis also highlights the connection between the systems of elements discussed earlier in the discourse and the limits of possibility in spiritual life. If human experience is constituted by various factors—including material elements, domains of space, and processes of cognition—then the condition of these factors directly influences how different possibilities manifest within experience. When cognition is shaped by ignorance and wrong views, the range of correct understanding becomes restricted. Conversely, when the conditions that give rise to wisdom are established, new possibilities for understanding and action become available.
At this point, the Bahudhātuka Sutta reveals a distinctive Buddhist perspective on the relationship between psychology and ethics. Ethical action is not understood merely as adherence to external rules; rather, it is closely connected to the state of the mind. When the mind is dominated by greed, hatred, and delusion, unwholesome actions readily arise. When these roots are eradicated, however, the corresponding actions lose the psychological foundation necessary for their emergence. Thus, the transformation of the mind not only changes how a person perceives the world but also alters the range of actions that can occur.
This leads to an important conclusion: in Buddhist teaching, liberation is not understood solely as a state of correct understanding, but also as a transformation in the structure of possibility within human action. When ignorance and distorted cognitive structures are removed, possibilities that lead to suffering gradually disappear, while possibilities associated with wisdom and compassion become more prominent. For this reason, the list of “things that cannot occur” in the Bahudhātuka Sutta should not be regarded as a secondary or incidental element of the discourse. Rather, it reflects a profound insight into the relationship between cognition, ethics, and liberation.
From a philosophical perspective, this part of the discourse also shows that Buddhist teaching is not concerned solely with describing reality; it is equally concerned with clarifying the conditions of possibility in human life. By identifying what cannot occur within certain states of mind, the Bahudhātuka Sutta emphasizes that human spiritual life possesses a structure that can be understood and analyzed. It is precisely this understanding of structure that enables practitioners to recognize the conditions necessary for transforming the mind and progressing along the path toward liberation.
V. Wrong View and Cognitive Error
One of the central aims of the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) is to clarify the relationship between misunderstanding the structure of reality and the emergence of wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi). In several passages of the discourse, the Buddha emphasizes that those who fail to understand the elements and the factors that constitute experience are prone to fall into mistaken views about the world and about themselves. This suggests that wrong view is not merely a matter of religious belief or philosophical opinion, but also the consequence of errors in understanding the structure of experience.
Within the context of early Buddhist thought, the notion of wrong view generally refers to perspectives that distort the way people understand reality and the relationship between action and its consequences. Such views may appear in various forms, including belief in a permanent self, metaphysical speculations about the nature of the world, or mistaken conceptions regarding karma and its results. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that Buddhist texts do not simply refute these views by proposing opposing doctrines. Instead, the teaching typically analyzes the structure of experience itself in order to demonstrate that such mistaken views arise from misunderstanding the constituent elements of reality.
The Bahudhātuka Sutta illustrates this approach clearly. By analyzing experience through multiple systems of elements—including material factors, domains of space, and processes of cognition—the discourse reveals that the world of experience is not a unified and independent entity. Rather, what people ordinarily call “the world” or “the self” is the result of interactions among many different conditions. When these elements are not correctly understood, individuals easily construct mistaken concepts and assumptions about the nature of reality.
One of the most common forms of wrong view is attachment to the notion of a permanent self. In ordinary experience, people tend to perceive themselves as a unified and stable entity standing behind sensations, thoughts, and actions. Yet when experience is analyzed into its constituent factors—such as the aggregates, the sense bases, or the elements—the idea of such an independent entity becomes difficult to sustain. What appears to be a “self” is in fact only a temporary combination of various material and psychological processes.
Although the Bahudhātuka Sutta does not systematically elaborate the doctrine of non-self in the same way as some other texts, its analysis of the elements indirectly undermines the foundations of belief in a permanent self. When experience is understood as a network of interdependent factors, the notion of an immutable subject standing behind phenomena becomes unnecessary for explaining experience. In this context, the wrong view of self may be understood as a mistake in the way experience is conceptually structured.
Beyond attachment to self, wrong view can also manifest as metaphysical speculation about the nature of the world. In several Pāli discourses, the Buddha refers to views asserting that the world is eternal or non-eternal, finite or infinite, or that a soul exists independently of the body. Such views are typically presented as attempts to explain reality through speculative metaphysical hypotheses. From the standpoint of the Buddhist teaching, however, these speculations fail to address the fundamental problem of suffering, because they rest upon mistaken assumptions about the structure of experience.
The Bahudhātuka Sutta suggests that analyzing experience in terms of elements provides an alternative approach to this problem. Instead of asking metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of the world, the discourse focuses on examining the concrete factors that constitute human experience. When these factors are carefully observed, many metaphysical questions become unnecessary or irrelevant to the explanation of experience. In this way, understanding the elements not only clarifies the structure of reality but also helps avoid metaphysical debates that do not contribute to the cessation of suffering.
From an epistemological perspective, wrong view can therefore be understood as a form of cognitive error. Such errors arise when the mind interprets experience according to patterns that do not correspond to the actual structure of phenomena. When individuals assume that experience is organized around a permanent subject or that phenomena exist independently of the conditions that produce them, these assumptions create a distorted understanding of reality. Consequently, human actions and responses are shaped by these mistaken interpretations.
Within this framework, understanding the elements may be regarded as a method for correcting cognitive errors. When practitioners observe their experience in light of analytical frameworks such as the aggregates, the sense bases, and the elements, they gradually recognize that what appears to be a stable entity is in fact a series of constantly changing processes. This realization is not merely theoretical; it directly influences the way individuals experience the world and respond to phenomena.
For this reason, the Bahudhātuka Sutta suggests that the path to wisdom does not consist solely in abandoning mistaken beliefs. It also requires a restructuring of the way experience itself is understood and interpreted. When the structure of experience is correctly recognized, many forms of wrong view naturally lose their foundation. This recognition opens the possibility for a new way of seeing reality—one in which phenomena are understood as dependently arisen processes, devoid of inherent selfhood and continually subject to change.
Thus, the analysis of wrong view in the Bahudhātuka Sutta indicates that the fundamental problem of suffering does not lie only in incorrect actions or mistaken beliefs, but in the way human beings structure and interpret their experience. When this structure is shaped by ignorance, wrong views arise and lead to reactions that generate suffering. Conversely, when the structure of experience is understood correctly in light of its constituent elements and conditions, the possibility of right understanding gradually emerges, opening the way for the transformation of the mind and the cessation of suffering.
VI. Domains of Experience in the Bahudhātuka Sutta
If the previous sections of this article have shown how the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) analyzes the structure of experience through systems of elements such as the six elements and the eighteen elements, the discourse goes even further by presenting various kinds of elements associated with domains of existence and states of feeling. These systems expand the scope of the concept of dhātu, demonstrating that “elements” are not limited to material or cognitive factors but may also refer to domains or layers of existential experience.
Through the examination of these systems, the Bahudhātuka Sutta presents a picture in which human experience is constituted by multiple levels—from the material structure of the world to processes of cognition, from states of feeling to different modes of existence of consciousness.
1. The Three Realms and the Structure of Existential Experience
One of the important systems of elements mentioned in the discourse is the three realms, consisting of:
- kāmadhātu – the sensual realm
- rūpadhātu – the form realm
- arūpadhātu – the formless realm
In Buddhist tradition, these three realms are often understood as levels within Buddhist cosmology. However, when considered in the context of the Bahudhātuka Sutta, they can also be interpreted as different levels of experiential consciousness.
The sensual realm (kāmadhātu) refers to the domain of experience dominated by sensory objects and the corresponding forms of desire associated with them. This is the familiar level of human life, where the senses and their objects play a central role in shaping the individual’s experience.
The form realm (rūpadhātu), by contrast, is associated with deeper states of meditative absorption in which the influence of coarse sensory objects gradually diminishes. At this level, experience still involves form and structure, but it becomes refined through the concentration and tranquility of the mind.
The formless realm (arūpadhātu) represents even more subtle meditative states in which material form no longer plays a role in experience. These states are described as levels of consciousness in which the mind experiences domains such as infinite space or infinite consciousness.
Viewed in this way, the three realms do not merely describe a cosmological structure but also reflect a spectrum of possibilities within conscious experience. This suggests that in Buddhist teaching, the world and consciousness are not entirely separate domains but rather different dimensions of the same structure of experience.
2. Elements of Feeling
In addition to the elements related to structures of existence, the Bahudhātuka Sutta also refers to several elements associated with states of feeling. These include:
- sukha-dhātu – the element of pleasure
- dukkha-dhātu – the element of pain
- somanassa-dhātu – the element of joy
- domanassa-dhātu – the element of sorrow
- upekkhā-dhātu – the element of equanimity
These elements reflect another dimension of human experience: the ways in which phenomena are felt emotionally and affectively. In ordinary experience, states such as pleasure, pain, joy, or equanimity are often regarded as subjective reactions of an individual to events in the world. In the Bahudhātuka Sutta, however, these states are analyzed as “elements”—that is, as domains or factors of experience that can be observed and distinguished.
This analysis carries an important implication. When states of feeling are understood as elements of experience, they are no longer interpreted as expressions of a “self” that experiences the world. Instead, they become processes that can be observed as phenomena arising and changing in dependence upon conditions.
From this perspective, feelings such as pleasure or pain are not properties of a fixed subject but states that arise within the stream of experience. They emerge when appropriate conditions are present and disappear when those conditions change.
3. Elements as Domains of Experience
When all the systems of elements are considered together—from material elements and cognitive elements to elements of feeling and elements of existence—the Bahudhātuka Sutta shows that human experience can be analyzed from multiple dimensions. Each system of elements highlights a particular aspect of reality, yet all contribute to clarifying the structure of experience.
This suggests that the concept of dhātu in Buddhism is not merely a classificatory device but also a method for recognizing that experience is composed of multiple interacting domains. These domains include the material aspects of the world, processes of cognition, states of feeling, and levels of conscious existence.
When understood in this way, the world of experience no longer appears as a single unified entity controlled by a central subject. Instead, it appears as a network of different experiential domains, each with its own characteristics and conditions.
4. The Philosophical Significance of the Domains of Experience
This analysis carries a profound philosophical significance. By presenting multiple systems of elements, the Bahudhātuka Sutta suggests that reality cannot be adequately understood from a single perspective. Instead, human experience must be examined from multiple dimensions, including material structure, cognitive processes, feeling, and states of consciousness.
This approach reflects a characteristic method of Buddhist thought. Rather than seeking a single underlying substance behind all phenomena, the teaching analyzes experience into multiple elements and domains. Such analysis weakens assumptions about a permanent essence and opens the possibility of understanding phenomena as processes of dependent arising that are constantly changing.
For this reason, the systems of elements presented in the Bahudhātuka Sutta serve not merely as classificatory schemes but as analytical methods that help practitioners recognize the multidimensional and interdependent nature of experience. When phenomena are seen as domains of experience arising in dependence upon conditions, attachment to fixed concepts of self and world gradually weakens, making possible the emergence of wisdom and liberation.
VII. The Bahudhātuka Sutta and the Emergence of Analytical Method in Buddhist Philosophy
When placed within the broader context of the history of Buddhist thought, the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) may be regarded as one of the texts that clearly reflects the analytical tendency characteristic of this tradition. Rather than presenting the teaching primarily in the form of metaphysical propositions or doctrinal assertions about the nature of reality, the discourse focuses on analyzing experience into multiple elements and domains. This analytical method later became an important foundation for the development of several Buddhist philosophical systems, particularly within the Abhidharma traditions.
In the Pāli discourses, this analytical tendency already appears in various forms. Systems such as the five aggregates (khandha), the twelve sense bases (āyatana), and the eighteen elements (dhātu) all represent attempts within the Buddhist teaching to clarify the structure of experience by dividing phenomena into constituent factors. The Bahudhātuka Sutta, however, stands out among these texts because it presents a wide range of systems of elements within a single discourse—from the material elements of the world, to processes of cognition, states of feeling, and levels of conscious existence.
The diversity of these classificatory systems suggests that the discourse is not merely describing a single aspect of reality but presenting a method of analysis in which experience can be examined from multiple perspectives. This feature makes the Bahudhātuka Sutta a particularly significant text for understanding how Buddhist thought gradually moved from the practical teachings of the early discourses toward the more elaborate philosophical analyses developed in later traditions.
Within the Abhidharma traditions, this analytical method was developed in a more systematic manner. Abhidharma texts attempt to classify the entirety of reality into fundamental elements (dhamma) and to examine the relationships among them. Detailed systems of classification concerning mental states, psychological factors, and material phenomena were constructed in order to clarify the structure of experience and the conditions that give rise to suffering or liberation.
Although the Bahudhātuka Sutta does not present a fully developed philosophical system in the sense found in Abhidharma literature, the way it analyzes experience through multiple systems of elements reveals a similar mode of thinking. Rather than treating the world as a unified entity, the discourse divides experience into different domains and examines how the factors within these domains interact with one another. This approach provides a methodological foundation for the more elaborate analytical efforts that emerged later.
Another important point is that the Bahudhātuka Sutta does not employ this analytical method as an end in itself. The analysis of experiential factors in the discourse is always connected with the goal of understanding the nature of suffering and the path leading to its cessation. This reflects a fundamental characteristic of Buddhist philosophy: analyses of reality are not undertaken merely for theoretical purposes, but are directed toward the transformation of understanding and the liberation from suffering.
For this reason, when the Bahudhātuka Sutta is compared with later Abhidharma systems, an important difference becomes apparent. While the Abhidharma traditions developed increasingly detailed and complex classificatory schemes concerning the elements of reality, the Bahudhātuka Sutta retains a closer connection to direct human experience. The systems of elements presented in the discourse are not intended to construct a comprehensive map of the universe but to help practitioners understand the structure of experience and recognize the mistaken assumptions that give rise to wrong view.
Nevertheless, this very approach opened the way for the later development of Buddhist philosophical traditions. By demonstrating that experience can be analyzed into multiple elements and domains, the Bahudhātuka Sutta lays the groundwork for a mode of thinking in which reality is investigated through the structures and relationships among phenomena. This method was later expanded by Abhidharma scholars into more detailed systems of analysis concerning mind and matter.
From the perspective of intellectual history, the Bahudhātuka Sutta may therefore be understood as a text situated at the intersection between canonical teaching and the analytical philosophy of Buddhism. The discourse retains the directness and practical orientation characteristic of the Nikāya teachings, yet it also reveals an emerging analytical tendency within the tradition.
For this reason, when read within the broader context of Buddhist thought, the Bahudhātuka Sutta is not merely a discourse presenting various systems of elements. It also reflects an important development in the way the teaching approaches the understanding of reality: a movement from direct doctrinal instruction toward an analytical method capable of examining the structure of experience in a systematic manner. It is precisely this method that later played a crucial role in the formation of several Buddhist philosophical traditions.
VIII. Conclusion: Wisdom as Skillfulness in the Elements
One of the most significant points of the Bahudhātuka Sutta (MN 115) appears at the conclusion of the discourse, where the Buddha defines the criterion by which a monk may be regarded as truly wise. According to the teaching, a monk can be considered possessed of wisdom and right understanding only when he is skilled in the elements (dhātu) presented in the discourse. This statement indicates that the various systems of elements analyzed in the Bahudhātuka Sutta are not merely theoretical classificatory schemes but cognitive tools that play an important role in the life of practice.
In this context, wisdom is not understood as the ability to engage in metaphysical speculation about the nature of the world, nor as the possession of a set of abstract concepts about reality. Instead, wisdom is defined as the capacity to correctly recognize and distinguish the constituent elements of experience. A monk who is skilled in the elements is one who can discern the different domains of reality—from material factors and cognitive processes to states of feeling and levels of conscious existence—and understand how these elements interact with one another.
When the systems of elements are considered within the overall structure of the discourse, it becomes clear that they provide a method through which practitioners can observe their experience in a systematic way. Rather than viewing the world as a unified entity experienced by a fixed subject, the practitioner learns to recognize that experience is in fact composed of multiple elements and domains. This capacity for discernment weakens mistaken assumptions about self and world, while opening the possibility for a new way of understanding reality.
This also explains why the Bahudhātuka Sutta devotes considerable attention to analyzing different systems of elements. These analyses are not intended to construct a purely philosophical theory about the structure of the universe, but rather to assist practitioners in developing a correct understanding of experience. When the elements of experience are clearly recognized, forms of wrong view arising from confusion among different factors gradually disappear.
From this perspective, being “skilled in the elements” may be understood as a particular cognitive capacity. The practitioner does not merely memorize the classificatory systems presented in the discourse, but learns to apply them in observing his own direct experience. When it is seen that phenomena are simply elements arising and changing in dependence upon conditions, attachment to fixed concepts of self and world gradually weakens.
For this reason, the Bahudhātuka Sutta suggests that wisdom in Buddhism does not lie in constructing complex metaphysical systems, but in recognizing the true structure of experience. A monk is regarded as wise not because he formulates theories about reality, but because he is able to perceive the elements of experience clearly and without confusion.
From this perspective, the entire discourse may be understood as a lesson in a method of cognition. By analyzing experience through multiple systems of elements, the Bahudhātuka Sutta offers an approach that enables practitioners to understand reality without relying on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the world or of the self. It is precisely this understanding that opens the possibility for the emergence of wisdom—a wisdom grounded not in speculation, but in the correct discernment of the elements that constitute experience.
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